What's going on in Ukraine?

[Calculon]

Lots of these videos but this one got me




Could this war be the end of the Russian empire?

[tabascoboy]

Persistent rumours since early morning about contingents of the RU forces in the Kherson area making contact about surrender terms to UA. Sounds like mind games to me, nothing further has come of it yet anyway.

Also if true, this could be encouraging

[tabascoboy]

Chinese President Xi Jinping Will Meet His Russian Counterpart Vladimir Putin In-Person for the First Time Since Moscow Invaded Ukraine [ in Uzbekistan]

No doubt when this meeting was arranged, the situation was very different. Wonder how they're both going to play this one

------------------------------------

[tabascoboy]

And a good read: As Ukraine counterattacks, Russia’s military facing steep artillery, resupply challenges
Even before this weeks' gains by Ukraine, there were signs that Russia's artillery is wearing down, and that it is running low on munitions - potentially limiting Moscow's options.

[Sinkers]

Timothy Snyder is currently teaching a class on the making of modern Ukraine.

First lecture is here:

[GogLais]

Timothy Snyder is currently teaching a class on the making of modern Ukraine.

First lecture is here:

I’ve read his Bloodlands and whatever the other is called. A terrible history.

[tabascoboy]

Old post, but you wonder how much looted goods have been dropped in the scramble to "regroup"

[Hellraiser]

UAF have broken through the Russian line at Davydiv Brid.

[fishfoodie]

UAF have broken through the Russian line at Davydiv Brid.

Time for the Orcs to put on the running shoes again, if they don't want to get caught on the wrong side of Dnipro !

[Uncle fester]

Makes sense not to throw good after bad.

[Hellraiser]

Makes sense not to throw good after bad.

It's not about that. On the one hand there is basically nothing left to send and on the other there is a not insignificant chance that troops will be required domestically quite soon.

[Niegs]

Or maybe that they're also having difficulty forcing anyone to go?

[Uncle fester]

Was being sarky.

[TB63]

https://textuploader.com/tt66s

Long read, but informative..

[tabascoboy]

[TB63]

[tabascoboy]

Russia tries to pass off a faked up attack by UA special forces on a barge against the ZNPP as real

[TB63]

[Flockwitt]

I think he plagiarised that one but it's still a great line.

Good advances in north Kherson. Let's see if Ukraine can finish them off there.

[Glaston]

Report that the first group of soldiers have finished their training in the UK.
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/35 ... itain.html

[Calculon]

Really wish I knew what the underlying sentiment is in Russia right now.

Good twitter thread on exactly that

[petej]

Really wish I knew what the underlying sentiment is in Russia right now.

Good twitter thread on exactly that

Thanks

[Hellraiser]

[fishfoodie]

Again, not a new story. A few times on this thread, I've quoted sections from Clancy's, "Red Storm Rising", which was about a fictional war between NATO & the USSR, but, at the same time, predicted problems that have reliably shown up. When they had 5 Year plans, workers learned to lie about output, & workers said; "while the bosses pretend to pay us, I'll pretend to work !".

With the Military, they learnt the same game; that when the Politicians set you impossible tasks; rather than failing, you just lied to them, & didn't fail.

Now they're discovering that all those tanks aren't actually a week away from activation, & those fuel bunkers aren't full, & the newly activated reserves don't number 500, but closer to 50......

"Our troops need extensive unit training. Over the weekend I read through
more than eighty regimental readiness reports from our tank and motor-rifle
divisions." Alekseyev paused before going on. Tactical training and readiness
was the bane of the Soviet military. Their troops were almost entirely
conscripts, in and out in two years, half of whose uniformed service was
occupied just in acquiring basic military skills. Even the noncoms, the
backbone of every army since the Roman legions, were conscripts selected for
special training academies, then lost as soon as their enlistment periods ended.

For that reason, the Soviet military leaned heavily on its officers, who often
performed what in the West was sergeants' work. The professional officer corps
of the Soviet Army was its only permanent, only dependable feature. In theory.
"The truth of the matter is that we don't know our readiness posture at the
moment. Our colonels all use the same language in their reports, without the
slightest deviation. Everyone reports meeting norms, with the same amount of
training hours, the same amount of political indoctrination, the same number
of practice shots fired—that is, a deviation of under three percent!—and the
requisite number of field exercises run, all of course of the proper type."

"As prescribed in our training manuals," the Colonel General noted.

"Naturally. Exactly--too damned exactly! No deviation for adverse weather. No
deviation for late fuel deliveries. No deviation for anything at all. For example,
the 703rd Motor-Rifle Regiment spent all of last October on harvesting duty
south of Kharkov—yet somehow they met their monthly norms for unit training
at the same time. Lies are bad enough, but these are stupid lies!"

"It cannot be as bad as you fear, Pavel Leonidovich."

"Do we dare to assume otherwise, Comrade?"

Putin dared to assume that the bullshit that a dozen layers of military leadership told him, was truth; & that somehow, the rampant corruption that he'd allowed over all the rest of Russia, wasn't present over it's Military (despite dozens of reports otherwise), & now he's fucked; because he was too busy looting the national coffers, & assumed that everyone else would be more diligent than him .....

[Uncle fester]

Or he simply assumed that Ukraine would be even worse. And in fairness, Russia steamrolled them in 2014 so Putin likely thought more of the same was likely.

Russia probably isn't measurably weaker than in 2014 but Ukraine were far far stronger, determined and more able to resist.

[tabascoboy]

Russian government tells pilots to repair planes on their own to save on technicians
https://theins.ru/en/news/255009

In Russia, pilots of regional flights are being told to carry out aircraft maintenance on their own, says Oleg Bocharov, deputy head of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Telegram channel Aviatorshchina reports.

“Together with the Ministry of Transport, we are to train and certify pilots as universal soldiers: they should act both as pilots and aircraft technicians at the same time. And the equipment must provide for the possibility of field repair operation,” Bocharov said. According to him, first of all it concerns regional aviation pilots. They have been told to create “a fundamentally new system of maintaining airworthiness.”

This practice is being introduced to save money, said an anonymous aviation expert in an interview with The Insider.
“They want to save money on technicians so that only pilots who agree do a technician’s work part-time will need to be paid. There is such a practice in light aviation, but not in commercial aviation, which is in the business of transporting passengers for money. It is more common in general aviation (GA), where pilots fly for personal purposes (commercial passenger flights are prohibited in GA). Safety requirements are much lower in GA than in commercial aviation, so pilots there are able to train as technicians and maintain their aircraft. But pilots can't do all types of aircraft maintenance. They can do simple types of work, but not the complex ones.”

The Ministry of Industry and Trade is also working on marketing the small aircraft Baikal, which is scheduled for completion in 2023 in its basic configuration, the Ministry says. At the same time the Ministry says it has launched a series of efforts that will enable improvement of the aircraft in the course of its operation by effectively turning the plane into a designer set. Bocharov explained that in this way airlines together with pilots will be able to quickly upgrade the aircraft for a particular flight, “to transform it for cargo, cargo-passenger or passenger configuration.”
However, says the expert, the Baikal aircraft design utilizing a U.S.-made engine has not yet been completed, and there are no certified Russian engines for this class of aircraft. It is necessary to revive small aviation before pondering innovation:

“We simply do not have certified engines for this class of aircraft. And in practice, Russian engines are very high maintenance in their operation, just like the Zhiguli car from AvtoVAZ. So, this idea looks silly and ridiculous, considering the quality of Russian civil aircraft from the state aviation industry. Small aviation has been almost completely destroyed in Russia, and there aren't even any pilots, because there are only two state universities in the country that train them. There are no technicians either, because they have almost nothing to work on. Before we develop any innovations in the field of maintaining the airworthiness of small craft, we first need to revive small aviation and then think about innovations.”

Earlier it was reported that the Ministry of Industry and Trade planned to replace airline co-pilots with virtual ones in order to reduce operational costs. On August 9, the Ministry posted a notice to the portal of public procurements for a tender worth 2.9 billion rubles ($ 48,013,270.00) to develop such technology by the end of 2024. This is contrary to international rules of flight safety, according to which there should be at least two people in the cabin.

Russian airlines also recommended their pilots to use less brakes when landing and taxiing in order to prolong the operational life of Western airliners, parts for which are not supplied because of the sanctions. Sanctioned Russian airlines, including Aeroflot, have been dismantling planes to ensure a stock of spare parts they can no longer buy abroad.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, harsh sanctions were imposed on Russia, which also affected the aviation industry. The U.S. authorities banned exports for Russian airlines in April. Also, the European Union Flight Safety Committee put Aeroflot and a number of other Russian airlines on the list of carriers that are banned or restricted from flying within the EU. In April it was reported that Russian airlines operating domestic aircraft Sukhoi Superjet 100 cannot repair and maintain the Russian-French SaM146 engines.

Later, both the EU and Britain and the U.S. Treasury relaxed the sanctions on civil aviation products. The U.S. made some relaxations for transactions involving the supply or export of goods, technologies or services for civil aviation security. A prerequisite for such transactions is the registration of civil aviation-only aircraft outside Russia. The EU Council specified that interaction with Russia regarding aviation goods and services would be allowed to the extent required to meet safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

[yermum]

Just like every armed force has its traditions (Rum bum and sun for the Navy, dimwit second sons of the landed gentry getting a commission in the Army) Russia has a proud and noble tradition of corruption and graft that predates the soviet era.

Reports from the Crimean War seem relevant to todays conflict:
The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
Wall of text spoiler from the economist 1854

Spoiler

Show

A YEAR ago we ventured to hint that it might be worthwhile for Europe to go to war with Russia for the sake of information — in order to ascertain that is whether her strength was that of the bully or the giant — whether she was really entitled to dictate and domineer as she habitually did — whether, in a word, she was mighty in virtue of her own inherent force, or only in virtue of the ignorant timidity of her foes and rivals. We pointed out several notable sources of weakness in her institutions; we directed attention to the fact that nearly all her great acquisitions had been secured not by fighting but by bullying and intriguing; that diplomacy and not war had always been her favourite weapon; that she kept up such an enormous army on paper that all secondary States had arrived at the conclusion that resistance to her will was hopeless, but that in general she bad carefully abstained from coming into actual armed collision with any first rate Power. We expressed an opinion, too, that there was no reason whatever to suppose that her armies were as effective now as in 1815, when they were supported by the subsidies of England and trained and disciplined by wars with France; and we ventured to surmise that when they came into actual conflict with competent forces and skilful commanders they would exhibit a degree of feebleness and failure that would cause general amazement. Our suspicions have now been more than realised. […]

This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.

In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action. […]

Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.

This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.

Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.

Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.

Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.

[tabascoboy]

[Jock42]

No shagging sheep or gorse bushes.

[inactionman]

No shagging sheep or gorse bushes.

Very enlightened. They understand that mistakes can be made, especially with rape.

[Flockwitt]

.

Excellent thank you.

[Deepsouth]

The Russians are fucked. Wipe them off the board. They are spent.

China remains.....

[tabascoboy]

[Niegs]

Just like every armed force has its traditions (Rum bum and sun for the Navy, dimwit second sons of the landed gentry getting a commission in the Army) Russia has a proud and noble tradition of corruption and graft that predates the soviet era.

Reports from the Crimean War seem relevant to todays conflict:
The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
Wall of text spoiler from the economist 1854

Spoiler

Show

A YEAR ago we ventured to hint that it might be worthwhile for Europe to go to war with Russia for the sake of information — in order to ascertain that is whether her strength was that of the bully or the giant — whether she was really entitled to dictate and domineer as she habitually did — whether, in a word, she was mighty in virtue of her own inherent force, or only in virtue of the ignorant timidity of her foes and rivals. We pointed out several notable sources of weakness in her institutions; we directed attention to the fact that nearly all her great acquisitions had been secured not by fighting but by bullying and intriguing; that diplomacy and not war had always been her favourite weapon; that she kept up such an enormous army on paper that all secondary States had arrived at the conclusion that resistance to her will was hopeless, but that in general she bad carefully abstained from coming into actual armed collision with any first rate Power. We expressed an opinion, too, that there was no reason whatever to suppose that her armies were as effective now as in 1815, when they were supported by the subsidies of England and trained and disciplined by wars with France; and we ventured to surmise that when they came into actual conflict with competent forces and skilful commanders they would exhibit a degree of feebleness and failure that would cause general amazement. Our suspicions have now been more than realised. […]

This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.

In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action. […]

Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.

This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.

Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.

Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.

Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.

I'm no expert on 19th century warfare, but would some of that have been true for other nations then? I feel like it might have been in the days when aristocrats raised and maintained their regiments.

Either way, when others have moved on and learned lessons over time, it sounds like the Russians are still maintaining some 'traditions' over 150+ years later.

[tabascoboy]

No expert but these look like nearby launches so expect there was another misfire and they took one of their own. Also RU authorities displeased about numerous videos on social media which also backs up they wanted to hush it up...

[FalseBayFC]

Interesting Economist podcast - 30 mins.


As Ukraine’s counter-offensive puts the Kremlin on the back foot, host Anne McElvoy talks to Wesley Clark, a retired four-star US general, about the significance of the turnaround, and Russia-watcher Alexander Gabuev analyses the consequences for Putin at home

https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2022 ... ry.content

[tabascoboy]

Partisans maybe although the one in Kherson could have been a missile as it was a large explosion

[TB63]

[tabascoboy]

[tabascoboy]

Becoming ever more hazardous to be a known quisling