What's going on in Ukraine?

[lemonhead]

Believe when I see it.

But even empty words recognise the disconnect and are a country mile better than a few weeks ago.

[tabascoboy]

Here's a small quote from an article that explains it quite well

the Kremlin plays an entirely different game. While the US thinks “ceasefire first, then talk,” the Russian playbook reads “keep shooting until negotiations favor us, then maybe stop.” Classic Russia. Americans don’t get this fundamental difference, but they’re learning the hard way.

[Hellraiser]

OSINT Analysis: Tanks, Bases, and Factories of Muscovy as of Early 2025

There have been reports of problems in the motorised component of Moscow's troops actively discussed online and in professional communities, as the Moscovite army has been using civilian cars for assault purposes, various kinds of improvised vehicles, and in individual cases, using domestic animals for logistics between positions.

To analyse trends in the armour potential of Moscow's occupation forces, The Resurgam Analytical Centre, together with the team of the Viyskovyy Vishchun online community, decided to update last year's study of Moscow's reserves at storage bases, which was conducted in cooperation with Mortis Aeterna.

And we will start from the end. Here are some of the conclusions drawn during the research.

Conclusions reached during the implementation of the research.

During the calculations, we had to take into account the units that had previously been considered scrap metal. The reason for this step was that new images from most storage bases showed activity in the ‘cemeteries’ area.

In other words, in those areas of the bases where equipment was chaotically located, the restoration of which was almost equivalent to making a new unit from scratch, and sometimes even longer and more expensive, the new images recorded activity for the first time in three years. Therefore, even empty ‘bodies’ were counted as a unit of equipment. Although logically, it would seem that we should not have done so...

The count of tanks in storage bases based on images as of February 2025 showed us that since 2022, 2069 tanks of various types have been removed from open-type storage bases (i.e., in the open air). We also estimate that up to 2,000 tanks were stored under closed storage (i.e. in hangars), and as the best units, tanks from hangars were removed primarily, as evidenced by a number of images showing no activity near hangars for a long time.

1. In total, from 2022 to 2025, Moscovia has decommissioned, according to our estimates, more than 4,000 tanks of various types, which is 54%, or almost all tanks, which were in good condition for restoration. As a result, it is important to note that the rate of tank removal from storage bases has dropped significantly. While thousands of tanks were removed annually from 2022 to 2024, from February 24 to February 25, the number of tanks removed from open storage was only 342.

2. At the same time, 3,463 are still at the main storage bases, which indicates the exhaustion of easily repairable tanks. This is because armoured vehicle factories need more and more time to restore a unit of equipment.

3. Meanwhile, there are still 1253 tanks on the sites of the armoured vehicle plants themselves. It is worth noting that the number of tanks began to decline for the first time from 1,500 in February 2024. This indicates a drop in the rate of receipt of military equipment from storage bases.

4. So in total, there are about 4,716 tanks at storage bases and armoured vehicle repair plants. However, it is crucial to understand that most of them will not be restored or will be used as donors of spare parts for the restoration and maintenance of existing tanks.



In general, we estimate that about 1,200 tanks can still be restored from storage faster than being produced from scratch. The rest would be equivalent in time to producing a unit from scratch, which would have a catastrophic impact on the replacement of losses. We will discuss the arguments for this assessment and the calculation below.

5. Counting AFVs. Since the images we received and acquired included the main storage areas for armoured fighting vehicles: from BMP-1/2/3, BMD, MTLB, MTLB (u) to APCs 50/60/70, we decided to count them as well. AFVs, from tracked to wheeled, stored at the main storage bases, decreased by 43%, or by 3,252 out of 7,445 recorded at the surveyed bases as of 2021.

It is worth mentioning that as a starting point in 2021, we take the data of Jompi and Coverta Cabala researchers who conducted a detailed study of these aspects.

Also, before considering each base, I think it is worth mentioning some interesting related observations.

1. At the Moscow storage bases, they began to sort through the ‘graveyards of equipment’, in addition to the equipment that was in storage. This was recorded for the first time during the observation period and indicates a high level of exhaustion of the available suitable stocks at the storage bases to recover losses.

2. Winter images for different periods of 2024/25, snow tracks and other surveillance tools allow us to record an almost complete absence of movement in the area of covered storage facilities (i.e. near hangars).

While at the beginning of 2024 some movements of equipment from the garages were recorded at some bases, as of December 2024/January 2025, there were no such movements. This gives us a certain opportunity to confirm that the equipment from the garages, as the most suitable for restoration, has already been removed from storage and has been sent either to the battlefield or to factories for restoration.

3. To compensate for the losses of the main Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), the deconservation of BTR-60/70 has begun. The shift in decommissioning from BTR-1/2, MT-LB, MT-LB(u) to less protected and wheeled BTR-60/70 indicates that the first mentioned vehicles are depleted and cannot be restored quickly.

4. Repair plants started using equipment stored in their own storage areas. The equipment in these areas at the ARMORED REPAIR PLANT (ARP) was most often dismantled for export orders or upgrades and stored without being moved for more than 10-15 years. This indicates that the leftovers at the storage bases are of approximately the same quality as the equipment that was cannibalised many years ago at the sites of the repair plants.

5. In 2022-2023, the massive amount of equipment brought in from storage bases gradually began to decrease in waiting areas, especially in the tank component. We estimate that in the second half of 2025, the restoration and modernisation of T-80 tanks will be finished due to the fact that they are depleted at storage bases and waiting areas at ARPs.

6. By the second half of 2025, tanks in ‘satisfactory condition’ suitable for more or less rapid restoration will be exhausted. There will be units that will require actual restoration from scratch, which will require appropriate financial and time costs.

7. From the second half of 2025, the main focus of restoration will shift to T-62 and T-55, which, although in poor condition, like the T-72 in storage, will be easier to restore when it comes to the need to restore from scratch.

8. According to our observations, the analysis of the movement of equipment from bases and ARPs, as well as the available data on the rate of restoration, provide an approximate (I emphasise approximate) correlation between the rate of restoration/production of tanks: in 2022, up to 120 units per month (or up to 1500 per year). By the end of 2023, the rate had dropped to 90 units (or 1,100 units per year). But this rate of tank production (by production we mean restoration + production) covered approximately the current annual losses of the Moscow army.

By the end of 2024, the average production rate had dropped to 50 tanks per month (600 tanks per year), which is significantly lower than the rate of losses, given the need to replace 1200-1300 tanks per year.

Initial observations in 2025 estimate the production rate at 30-35 units per month (or 360-400 tanks per year), with the potential for a sharp drop in the recovery rate at the end of the first half of 2025. The drop in the rate will be primarily due to the exhaustion of T-80s suitable for restoration and modernisation.



So what we see is that from the second half of 2025, the current rate of replacement of the Moscow army's tank losses will hypothetically cover no more than 30% of the current losses at the front.

Therefore, the population of tanks will rapidly decline from 2025 onwards, which in turn will lead to a decrease in the involvement of military equipment in assaults. And this will increase infantry losses during assaults, with consequences for the aggressor's economy.

Our conclusions are not a statement that Moscovia will be ‘without military equipment’. Moscow is capable of producing and will be able to restore equipment from its bases for some time as well. However, the intensity of the use of armoured vehicles in assaults will continue to decline due to a decline in the ability to replace losses. This, in turn, will lead to a corresponding increase in infantry losses and an increased burden on the Moscovia's budget for recruiting new soldiers and providing them with supplies.

In this case, the Moscow command will face a dilemma: either to slow down the pace of the offensive to reduce the need for armoured vehicles, or to reduce the involvement of vehicles in assaults and accept the increase in infantry losses with the corresponding military and economic consequences.

If the Moscow command attempts to maintain the current offensive pace by increasing the use of infantry, this will inevitably lead to a proportional increase in losses in the absence of sufficient motorised support.

For example, by 24 February 2022, the Muscovite army had a total of about 3,200 tanks. Between 2022 and 2024, Moscovia created 11 additional divisions, which, according to calculations (approximately 187 to 210 tanks per division), should have brought the number of tanks to 5,000-5,100.

However, according to the data of the US intelligence community and comments by various intelligence agencies, including the Ukrainian one, there were about 2,200 tanks in Ukraine and near the border in early 2024. Given the fact that at the end of the second half of 2024, the rate of losses exceeded the level of recovery, as of 2025, the Moscow formation has less than 2,000 tanks in Ukraine and near the border, according to our estimates. Or up to 40% of the required number of tanks.

In 2025, the Moscow industry will hypothetically produce, restore, and repair up to 400 units. That is, hypothetically, the grouping can have 2400 tanks, but taking into account the losses on the battlefield in 2025, if Moscow tries to maintain the pace of equipment deployment at the level of 2022/23/24, this will lead to the loss of 1200 tanks in 2025, which will reduce the total number of tanks to 1200 units in combat formations by the end of 2025 (i.e. 2400 that could be available with production, minus 1200 tanks).

And this is only 23% of the required number of tanks. In the future, with each production cycle, the rate of tank production will decrease due to the poorer quality of the units that will be restored.



Since 80% of the so-called manufactured tanks are recovered from storage bases, and only up to 20% are produced from scratch, this component will continue to be depleted. Of course, this will happen if the intensity and involvement of equipment is maintained.

The current production from scratch, according to the British International Institute for Strategic Studies, from 17 May 2022 to 6 May 2024, shows that Moscovia produced 164 T-90M tanks, or about 80 tanks per year.

These are the only tanks that Moscovia can produce from scratch. Although even these 80 units per year may include a certain amount of upgrading from T-90s, more than 100 of which were in storage, to the T-90M version.

As a result, reduced mechanisation will lead to increased losses and will increase pressure on the Moscow budget: from payments for the dead and wounded, to the maintenance of demobilised soldiers who have been injured, to the necessity to increase costs to attract new soldiers and to provide them with supplies.

Therefore, we emphasise that it is important to consider the decline in Moscow's ability to restore lost equipment not in the context of ‘run out of tanks, run out of war’. No. This is the wrong approach. There will always be a certain number of tanks and other armoured vehicles (because they are being manufactured), but their insufficient production rates to replace losses trigger other processes, from economic to political and social.

Therefore, this information on storage bases and restoration rates should be considered in conjunction with other factors, including: ‘what will be affected’ and what will be the consequences for the economy, etc.

It is also worth mentioning how much recovery potential is left in storage facilities?

We counted 3,463 tanks at storage bases. There are about 1253 more tanks at the waiting areas of ARPs. The total is 4716. But we should understand that not all of these tanks can and will be restored due to their technical condition.

For example, out of the total 4716 tanks, about 650 are T-64s, which cannot be restored due to the need for components manufactured in Ukraine. The only chance is smuggling, but how widespread it can be, considering that a certain number of T-64s are already in service in the Moscow army and need maintenance - it is a matter of debate.

That leaves about 4000+ tanks. Out of these, about 2/3 are tanks in extremely poor technical condition and therefore need to be restored almost from scratch. So most of them will likely be used as donors, and only a small part will be used for restoration in the last instance.

Therefore, only about 1,200 tanks can be restored somehow after overhaul, which will require more time and money, but will be slightly faster than production from scratch.



Eventually, Moscow's defence industry still has something to restore, but the question arises of the ‘rate of restoration’, which is rapidly decreasing along with the exhaustion of suitable equipment at storage bases.

We can already see in various ways that Moscow's troops are experiencing problems with mechanisation. The available equipment still enables them to conduct mechanised assaults, but production is no longer able to compensate for current losses.

Below, we will look at the interesting points for each of the bases separately and take a look at their local features.

22nd storage base

There are few changes in tanks.



This is due to the fact that the base has almost completely exhausted its potential. Of the 850 tanks at the base in 2021, 116 T-80 U/UD and T-80V/ VB tanks remained. The remains of the worst tanks were systematised and grouped in a separate area.

It is likely that the last T-80 units will be shipped to the ARPs closer to mid-2025, when they run out of tanks at the Omsktransmash site, which is engaged in the restoration and modernisation of T-80s. In the second half of 2025, the base can be considered ‘empty’.

Out of the 116 remaining tanks, about half are the Kharkiv version of the T-80UD. Due to the technical specifics of the design, it will be almost impossible to restore these vehicles without smuggling in scarce components (Kharkiv engines).


The worst remaining T-80 units have been systematically grouped at the 22nd base. Maxar

On AFVs.



A certain number of BMP-1s in mediocre condition were withdrawn. At the current rate, by the beginning of summer 2025, the base will be left with only a graveyard area.


A large number of BMP-1 units have been removed from the 22nd base. Maxar

111st storage base

On tanks



There were no particularly big movements compared to 2024. Out of a fleet of 890 tanks as of 2021, about 260 remained as of February 2025. These are mostly T-55s and T-62s in poor condition. Their use will potentially begin in the second half of 2025, when the stock of T-80s for renovation is completely exhausted.

On the AFVs



The situation is much more interesting. Active movements have begun in the area of the graveyard where the BMP-1s were located. In previous years, no activity was recorded in this area due to the terrible condition of the available machinery in this area of the ‘’graveyard‘’. In fact, there are previously dismantled vehicles there that were declared worthless and dragged away to the ‘disposal’ zone.

Now, some of the vehicles from this area are being dragged to the central part of the base (probably the workshops) and then returned to their original location. Traces in the snow also confirm these manipulations with the vehicles. The hulls of the armoured fighting vehicles disappeared from the graveyard at first, and after a while they reappeared, but in a different sector of the graveyard.

Such increased activity in the area of waste vehicles indicates that the vehicles are being sorted out for spare parts for potential donation to other vehicles. The machine is unblocked from the others, pulled to the centre of the base, sorted out, its parts removed and returned to a new location in the disposal area so that it is not confused with other machines that will later experience the same cycle.


Red markings indicate BMP-1 vehicles, chaotically moved from the graveyard zone of the 111th base. Maxar


Blue markings indicate the relocation of dismantled vehicles to the graveyard zone, where they were previously absent. Maxar

2544th storage base

On tanks.



Of the 436 tanks at the beginning of 2021, 277 remained as of January 2025. The remaining tanks were withdrawn in 2022/23. Since 2024, there has been almost no movement of military equipment.

Interestingly, out of the dozens of tanks that have disappeared since the last count, T-72s without turrets have begun to disappear. Perhaps they were transported to Kuberkovo to be used as donors or as a tracked base for some units of special military equipment.


Among the removed tanks, T-72 units without turrets are noticeable. Maxar

On the AFVs



After the depletion of the most suitable BMP-1/2 for restoration, the deconservation of BTR-60/70 began. The BTR-60/70, which have a wheelbase, are less protected and in a terrible condition, but are probably in better condition than the remaining BMP-1s at the base. Therefore, the BTR-60/ 70 will be more suitable for restoration than the remaining BMP-1s.

This detail indicates the practical exhaustion of BMP-1/ 2 that are suitable for restoration. In other words, not the kind of restoration that would be comparable in time and cost to producing a unit from scratch. BTR-60/70 were hardly moved from 2022 to 2024.


Mass decommissioning of BTRs in the worst condition. Maxar

769th storage base

On tanks



The base holds most of the T-62s in storage - more than 800 units. However, after the most suitable ones were decommissioned in 2022, there was virtually no activity around the tanks at the base in the following years. There were only isolated cases of cannibalisation of vehicles. Most of the T-62s are in a terrible condition and are described as ‘better dead than alive’, but we still take them into account. It is better to proceed from the worst-case scenario.


Complete lack of activity in the T-62 zone after the removal of serviceable vehicles. Maxar

On AFVs



Similar to other bases, interesting activity is observed around the BMP graveyard. Once again, I would like to point out that this is not a storage area for conservation equipment, but rather a ‘’graveyard‘’ area where technical remnants for disposal are located. They used to be for disposal. And they began to pull away and disperse these AFVs in the central part of the base to ensure free access to them from any side.

Probably, this is done in order to sort out several units and assemble a single serviceable one on the spot. Or they can be used solely as spare parts donors. No activity is observed at other sites of the base, which indicates that most of the units are ‘used up’ and require at least long-term restoration ( in fact, from scratch).


Activity in the graveyard zone: BMPs are being randomly extracted and dispersed in the central part of the base. Maxar

6018th storage base

On tanks



Out of the 200 tanks that were at the base in 2021, about 59 units remained, including empty hulls. These tanks are in the worst technical condition and have not been moved since 2023.

On AFVs.

There are no vehicles left in good condition. The 436 remaining BMP-1 and BTR-80 units include the worst condition models and in most cases can only be restored from an empty hull. As at other bases, the so-called ‘’graveyards‘’ have started to show the movement of vehicles. In one area, the BMPs were placed in a staggered pattern to ensure free access.


Dispersed BMP-1 units are being cannibalized for spare parts. Maxar


Empty BMP hulls have disappeared from the graveyard zone. Maxar

The goal, as at previous bases, is to turn several units into one working unit or to use them as a spare parts donor. At another site, where the worst examples of BMPs were stored, up to two dozen BMP-1s were removed in a chaotic order, indicating the search for those suitable for restoration.

As for all the bases, it will be relevant to add that there is almost no evidence of vehicle movement near the covered storage garages (tracked by footprints, especially in winter). This point confirms the thesis that the covered storage equipment was removed in previous years as it was in the best condition. Now the garages are empty. There could potentially have been from 1,500 to 2,000 tanks inside the garages, not including other equipment, as the available parking spaces allowed.

Armoured repair plants (ARPs)

General trend of the ARPs

1) After the massive delivery of equipment from storage bases for restoration in 2022/23, the number of vehicles in waiting areas sharply increased. And this overcrowding of waiting areas persisted from 2022/23 to early 2024. It was only in 2024 that it gradually began to decline, as fewer batches of equipment arrived for restoration from storage bases. The reason for this has already been discussed several times: the exhaustion of suitable equipment for relatively quick restoration.

2) There are significantly fewer cases of equipment being brought from storage bases to waiting areas.

3) According to superficial estimates, but based on long-term observations, the rate of tank restoration at ARPs has dropped from 120-150 per month in 2022 to 30-35 as of the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025. This conclusion is based on the rate at which tanks are being deconserved from storage bases, tendencies, movement in the waiting area of the ARPs, and other indicators. Of course, the numbers on the pace are subjective estimates, but these estimates have a number of confirmations.

103rd ARP



The number of tanks in the waiting area decreased from 700 as of February 2024 to 525 as of February 2025. For the first time, the plant switched to using T-62s from its own storage area. This area had been untouched for more than 10 years and was previously used to restore other machines. These processes show that the T-62s remaining in the storage bases are in no better condition than the previously partially cannibalised T-62s on the plant site. This makes it impractical to transport them from the storage base to the plant's waiting area.


T-62 tanks have been removed from the waiting area. Maxar

560th ARP



There are no major changes. The plant's capacities are busy restoring BMPs and BMD-2s. It seems that the plant is not engaged in tank restoration. As in the previous year, there are about a hundred tanks on its site.

Omsktransmash



A satellite image showed the arrival of T-80 tanks. This is likely to the last usable batch of T-80s to be delivered to the plant. There are 473 tanks stored at the plant, but it is unlikely that all of them will be restored and sent to the frontline. Many units have been cannibalised. There is no confirmation that the production of specifically T-80 tanks from scratch will be resumed. The plant is currently doing restoration/modernisation. By the summer of 2025, the vast majority of donors will have been used up and the pace of recovery will begin to drop significantly.

Conclusion

Trends on the frontline show a sharp increase in the use of civilian vehicles for assaults on Ukrainian positions by the occupation army of Moscovia. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the number of destroyed vehicles of the occupants skyrocketed from 1,000 per month at the beginning of the second half of 2024 to 3,000 by the end of the year.The rate of destruction of Moscow’s military vehicles continues



The increase in the number of destroyed Moscow vehicles is connected to both the development of UAVs in the Ukrainian army and the use of converted civilian vehicles for assault missions by the Moscow army. This jump in vehicle destruction cannot be attributed solely to the development of UAVs or the intensity of the battles.
At the same time, the rate of losses of tanks and other armoured vehicles began to fall due to fewer cases of their involvement in assaults. Approximately by half. From 300-400 recorded cases of damage and destruction of tanks in September-November 2024 to 200-240 in December 2024-January 2025.

The same trends are recorded not only in the data of the Ukrainian General Staff, but also in other Western OSINT researches.

The exhaustion of storage bases leads to a drop in the rate of restoration of equipment at the ARPs due to the increasingly poor quality of the samples received for restoration. The slowdown in restoration rates is beginning to create a shortage of military equipment in combat units. The longer the Moscow command tries to maintain the intensity of the fighting, the more critical this deficit becomes, eventually leading to a dilemma of choice: reduce the intensity or compensate for the lack of sufficient equipment with infantry.

Reducing the armoured and motorised component and increasing infantry assaults will lead to higher casualties. Higher casualties will require additional replacement funds from the budget. Additional replacement funds increase the burden on the budget and accelerate stagflationary trends in the Moscow economy, and so on with each lap of the cycle. As each cycle goes through a spiral, the negative effects become more severe, eventually turning the trends into a strategic factor.

That is why we are watching the storage bases and factories, not to tell you when Moscow will run out of tanks.

https://resurgamhub.org/osint/general-m ... -factories

[Hellraiser]

Merz wasn't kidding about more assertive German foreign policy. The new German government is going to support Article 7 suspension of Hungary's EC voting rights and push for expansion of qualified majority voting to CFSP.

https://www.politico.eu/article/germany ... rich-merz/

[Rhubarb & Custard]

This took a while

He also threatened to introduce secondary tariffs on Russian energy exports, targeting countries that buy Russian oil and gas with sanctions.

“If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault – which it might not be – but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia,” he added in a morning phone call to NBC on Sunday (local time).

“That would be that if you buy oil from Russia you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25 per cent tariff on all oil, a 25 to 50-point tariff on all oil.”

The Trump position on this does seem much more about China than Europe. Though no one seems quite sure what to make of India, not what their future intent might be nor just how much a/the global superpower they might end up.

Also worth noting alongside the supposed threats to Putin there was a further threat to Zelensky about not signing over Ukrainian assets to Trump

[Sandstorm]

“If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault – which it might not be – but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia,” he added in a morning phone call to NBC on Sunday (local time).

“That would be that if you buy oil from Russia you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25 per cent tariff on all oil, a 25 to 50-point tariff on all oil.”

Utter word salad again!

[tabascoboy]

And a few hours on, the inevitable backtracking

[Hellraiser]

Trump's opinion changes with the last person he spoke to. He should essentially be ignored.

[tabascoboy]

The one where Ukraine gets nothing and Russia gets everything short of a free license to attack any nation not in NATO not good enough?

Russia 'Cannot Accept' Trump's Ukraine Peace Plans

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the U.S. is not taking into account Russia's "main demand" to secure peace in its war on Ukraine, and so the Kremlin "cannot accept" American proposals as things stand.

U.S. President Donald Trump is attempting to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine, and has so far secured partial ceasefires in the Black Sea and against energy infrastructure. Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

"We have not heard from Trump a signal to Kyiv to end the war," Ryabkov told Russia's International Affairs magazine in an interview.

"All that we have today is an attempt to find a certain scheme that would first allow us to achieve a ceasefire, as it is conceived by the Americans.

"And then move on to some other models and schemes, in which, as far as we can judge, today there is no place for our main demand, namely, the solution of problems related to the root causes of this conflict."

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-cannot- ... ns-2053585

[Slick]

Any of you experts got an idea where this might end?

Most popular I guess is that the US capitulates to just about everything and Ukraine gets screwed, but is there also a possibility that Trump has enough, massively sanctions Russia and starts throwing money at Ukraine, for a while?

[Hellraiser]

Any of you experts got an idea where this might end?

Most popular I guess is that the US capitulates to just about everything and Ukraine gets screwed, but is there also a possibility that Trump has enough, massively sanctions Russia and starts throwing money at Ukraine, for a while?

The US can't force anything on Ukraine.

[Slick]

Any of you experts got an idea where this might end?

Most popular I guess is that the US capitulates to just about everything and Ukraine gets screwed, but is there also a possibility that Trump has enough, massively sanctions Russia and starts throwing money at Ukraine, for a while?

The US can't force anything on Ukraine.

That seems a little naive

[Uncle fester]

Russians have a mobilisation on.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36718p52eyo

[Hellraiser]

Any of you experts got an idea where this might end?

Most popular I guess is that the US capitulates to just about everything and Ukraine gets screwed, but is there also a possibility that Trump has enough, massively sanctions Russia and starts throwing money at Ukraine, for a while?

The US can't force anything on Ukraine.

That seems a little naive

Yeah, sure.

[Flockwitt]

Very importantly predicted trends are playing out.

March was a record month for Russian artillery losses. It was well noted that as Russia became more dependent on towed artillery they would in turn become more vulnerable to drone and counter battery fire and the results are being seen. It should be pointed out Ukraine is using cheap acoustic systems now as well as radar to locate artillery effectively.

Similarly as the Russian lack of IFVs means more non-armoured vehicle usage and the March data also supports that.

But the artillery trend is the big one. It's only March in 2025 and if this trend continues this is, finally, real evidence the attrition war is tipping in Ukraine's favour. Watch this space.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/commen ... ?rdt=58521

[Hellraiser]

Very importantly predicted trends are playing out.

March was a record month for Russian artillery losses. It was well noted that as Russia became more dependent on towed artillery they would in turn become more vulnerable to drone and counter battery fire and the results are being seen. It should be pointed out Ukraine is using cheap acoustic systems now as well as radar to locate artillery effectively.

Similarly as the Russian lack of IFVs means more non-armoured vehicle usage and the March data also supports that.

But the artillery trend is the big one. It's only March in 2025 and if this trend continues this is, finally, real evidence the attrition war is tipping in Ukraine's favour. Watch this space.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/commen ... ?rdt=58521

OSINT predictions are panning out as expected. The Summer campaigning season will be interesting to say the least.

[tabascoboy]

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1908478384365273506

Zelensky criticized the U.S. Embassy’s response to the Krivyi Rih attack:

"Such a strong country, such a strong people – yet such a weak reaction. They’re even afraid to say ‘Russian’ when talking about the missile that killed children."

He added: "Yes, the war must end, but that requires calling things by their name. We expect the U.S. to fulfill its commitment to finding additional Patriot systems."

[tabascoboy]

"said Russia might consider security guarantees for Ukraine." Well that worked out so well before

[tabascoboy]

[Hellraiser]

Russian crude has fallen below $60 a barrel. Squeaky bum time.

[tabascoboy]

[tabascoboy]

Russian crude has fallen below $60 a barrel. Squeaky bum time.

The Kremlin has vowed to shield Russia, the world’s second-largest crude exporter, from a global “economic storm” after the country’s top oil export grade tumbled toward its lowest trading price in nearly two years.

Oil prices have collapsed following a wave of sweeping tariffs announced last week by Donald Trump on America’s trading partners.

The tariffs have created general market uncertainty, fueling risks of a global recession and leading to Russia’s Urals crude, by far the nation’s main export stream, dropping to $52.76 a barrel at the Baltic Sea port of Primorsk on Friday, Bloomberg reported.

If prices fall below the $50 mark, it will push Urals crude to its lowest level since 2023.

https://tvpworld.com/86056508/russia-fa ... ices-fall-

[tabascoboy]

Article is paywalled, but this should get around it: https://archive.is/20250409081353/https ... e-protest/

[tabascoboy]

Russian crude has fallen below $60 a barrel. Squeaky bum time.

Brent oil prices fell below $60 today, Urals must be hovering around $50 by now. Have read that a fall to $45 would be pretty much crisis time

[Flockwitt]

Anders Nielson talking about a spring offensive for Russian and making some points about what was noted above regards attrition and manpower. He also lays it out well why the Kursk and then Belegrod operations were so important/successful in themselves.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kmU-Eazta1s

Also the conclusions that can be drawn from this are generally uniform.

[Hellraiser]

The German MoD has just announced a new military aid package to support #Ukraine. This will be financed with the over €11 billion that were approved in March for support until 2029.

The package
— 4 IRIS-T SAM systems (SLM/SLS mixed*)
— 300 missiles for IRIS-T SAM systems
— 30 MIM-104 Patriot missiles
— 300 reconnaissance drones
— 120 MANPADS
— 25 Marder 1A3 IFVs
— 15 Leopard 1A5 MBTs
— 14 artillery systems
— 100 ground surveillance radars
— ~ 130,000 155mm shells

The German MoD also announced that further agreements are currently being made regarding the delivery of additional IRIS-T systems in the coming years. The delivery of 1100 (!) ground surveillance radars is also on the cards.

* = In the press release, the German MoD states that the funds will be used to procure air defence systems with different ranges. This clearly indicates that the 4 IRIS-T SAM systems could actually be “only” 2 IRIS-T SLM fire units and 4 IRIS-T SLS launchers, for example.

Update — According to German Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius, the 30 Patriot missiles come from Bundeswehr stocks and have already been delivered!

Germany has also founded another capability coalition (Electromagnetic Combat) to support Ukraine, and 10 partner countries have currently joined.

https://bsky.app/profile/deaidua.org/post/3lmjj6wrmhk2x

[Hellraiser]

Rheinmetall is massively expanding its #ammunition production. For artillery ammunition (calibre 155mm), production capacity will have increased fifteenfold by 2027 - compared to the level at the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022. For the ammunition for battle tanks (caliber 120 mm), Rheinmetall will quadruple production by 2027.

And the expansion of capacity is going comparatively smoothly. Only 14 months have passed from the groundbreaking of the new ammunition plant for 155mm artillery ammunition in Unterlüß to the first floor production in April/May 2025. Approximately 200,000 pieces of artillery shells can be produced annually in the new plant in Unterlüß.

[tabascoboy]

Comments on this suggest that the ship looks likely empty and was more likely to be taking on a load of crude. Germany also arrested one of the "shadow" tankers a few days ago

[Flockwitt]

Ukraine is claiming internal production of 1 million drones per month.

They are also claiming a current loss ration of 1:7. Which needs the usual pinch of salt but with their improved tactics, the now constant infantry only assaults by the Russians, and the drone supremacy isn't out of reach. And that is an attrition losing statistic.

[Hellraiser]

Ballistic missile hit the centre of Sumy this morning. At least 20 dead.

[tabascoboy]

Ballistic missile hit the centre of Sumy this morning. At least 20 dead.

But we don't understand - Russia really want peace #Trumpisamoron

[Uncle fester]

Ballistic missile hit the centre of Sumy this morning. At least 20 dead.

But we don't understand - Russia really want peace #Trumpisamoron

Could do with implementing a tit for tat regime here and I don't mean hitting civilians in Russia, I mean assassinating commanders who order such strikes.

[tabascoboy]

Is this the moment Russia's hyped spring offensive falls flat? The latest move by Ukraine's Third Assault Brigade might suggest exactly that.

The fate of Russia’s push to seize the Donetsk Oblast now hangs on a single narrow river crossing over the Zherebets River — one that Ukraine just turned into a kill zone. What Moscow sold as a massive advance is unraveling fast, thanks to one fatal miscalculation: relying on a lone supply route as mud season hits.

Ukrainian commanders didn’t just notice the flaw — they struck with ruthless precision. Elite assault brigades cut off the only path for Russian armor right as the surrounding terrain turned to sludge.

The tactical masterstroke? Reworking their entire drone strategy to relentlessly hammer this one choke point before anything else. And once that crossing goes, thousands of Russian troops will face a brutal decision: retreat through the mud, or stay and get cut off.

Tap the link to learn how Ukraine flipped Russia's numerical advantage into a tactical nightmare: https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/12/ ... g-it-hard/

[tabascoboy]

And yet again with the "this war would never have started If I were in charge" bollocks

[Hellraiser]

On the basis of the 12th special forces brigade "Azov", a new operational-tactical unit was created as part of the NGU.

Now this is the 1st Corps "Azov", which includes:

• 1st presidential operational brigade "Bureviy";
• 12th Special Purpose Brigade "Azov";
• 14th operational brigade "Chervona Kalina";
• 15th operational brigade "Kara-Dag";
• 20th operational brigade "Lubart".

@yigal_levin

This is the second corps to be announced. And again based around former/current Azov units. Prokopenko as commander like Biletskyi with 3rd Corps AFU.

Edit: 13th Khartiia Brigade NGU is also becoming the base of a new corps.

[tabascoboy]

Every day, something different to the last

[tabascoboy]

[Hellraiser]

Europe | Fighting and talking

Trump’s Ukraine ceasefire is slipping away

The American president increasingly looks like Russia’s willing dupe

Apr 15th 2025|WASHINGTON, DC

Donald trump promised to end the war in Ukraine within a day. Now, insiders say, he hopes to secure a ceasefire within his first 100 days—ie, by the end of this month. He has started to refer to the conflict as “Biden’s war”. But if it drags on, he worries it will increasingly become his.

How to stop the fighting? Russia has ignored America’s call for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, which Ukraine accepted on March 11th. Instead it has played for time and intensified its attacks. On April 13th two Russian missiles struck the town of Sumy, killing 34 people, many of them gathering to attend Palm Sunday services. It followed a similar strike on Kryvyi Rih on April 4th that killed 20 people.

Radek Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, said Mr Trump’s team should realise that the Kremlin was “mocking their goodwill”. Mr Trump, though, seems immune to shame. He has proved peculiarly indulgent of Russia and hostile towards Ukraine. Even as some of his aides denounced the Russian attack on Sumy, Mr Trump suggested it was a “mistake”, albeit a “horrible” one. Astonishingly, on April 14th he blamed Ukraine for being invaded by Russia, shrugging off a Ukrainian request to buy American missiles. “You don’t start a war against somebody that’s 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles,” he declared.

Admirers of Mr Trump insist he is ready to get tough with Russia. He has renewed his predecessor’s sanctions on Russia, and has expressed impatience with the Kremlin, telling one interviewer that he was “pissed off” with Russia and floating the idea of imposing “secondary tariffs”, presumably on countries buying Russian oil. On April 11th he said, “Russia has to get moving.” European leaders are clamouring for additional sanctions on Russia to make such words count, so far to no avail.

In March Mr Trump briefly cut the weapons and intelligence to Ukraine. Keith Kellogg, an adviser, compared this to “hitting a mule with a two-by-four across the nose”. It worked: within days, Ukraine agreed to the 30-day ceasefire. For the obdurate Russians, however, there have been no sticks, only carrots. American and Russian officials met in Istanbul on April 10th to discuss upgrading their embassies. The countries also exchanged two prisoners. Russian media say the rapprochement is proceeding regardless of the Ukraine talks.

When Mr Trump announced his worldwide “reciprocal tariffs” this month, he whacked Ukraine with the minimum 10% universal rate while excluding Russia (supposedly because it was already under sanctions). One solace for Ukraine is that the turmoil of the trade war is such that the price of oil has tumbled from around $80 a barrel in January to $65, sharply cutting Mr Putin’s revenues.

Notably absent from Mr Trump’s discourse is any notion of additional military aid for Ukraine. Indeed, America’s support is dwindling. The flow of weapons approved by Joe Biden will run out in the coming months, and Mr Trump has not authorised any more. Another budget allocation to support Ukraine looks unlikely.

America is withdrawing troops and equipment from Rzeszow, a vital hub in Poland for weapons being sent to Ukraine. Their duties will henceforth be carried out by European troops. Meanwhile, Pete Hegseth, the American defence secretary, stayed away from a meeting in Brussels on April 11th of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, a gathering of 50-odd countries contributing military help that was created and led by his predecessor, Lloyd Austin, though Mr Hegseth joined by video link.

Another sign of the times is that Pentagon figures recently questioned one ally about why it was still supplying weapons to Ukraine—a challenge that was ignored. Diplomats in Washington also report that some Trump aides say privately that they are “fed up” with Europe’s effort to strengthen Ukraine. As always with such a chaotic administration, it is hard to distinguish the true signal from the noise.

For now Europeans are pushing along two tracks. The first is the effort by Britain and France to create a European “reassurance force” to help Ukraine after a ceasefire. Russia objects to that deployment, even if America is offering no assurance that it will back the Europeans. The force would not seek to police the front lines between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Instead it would stay away from the front, probably in western Ukraine, where it would concentrate on training Ukrainian forces, and perhaps do joint air patrols.

Europeans hope to show Mr Trump that they are taking up the burden of European security, hoping to retain at least some kind of American commitment, to NATO if not to Ukraine. Under this emerging scheme, the future “deterrence” of Russia would come in three zones: reinforced Ukrainian troops holding the line against Russia in the east, European forces in the west and, at least for now, a lingering American presence in NATO countries.

But the creation of such a force depends on an ever-elusive ceasefire. Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s envoy to Russia, is reported to have said that the quickest way of securing one would be to let Russia take four Ukrainian provinces which it claims, including territory it has failed to conquer. That would be unacceptable to Ukraine and its European partners.

All this reinforces the need for the second track: increasing Europe’s military assistance to Ukraine. David Shimer, a former official in Mr Biden’s National Security Council, says there is no time to waste. Europeans should give away more of their stocks of weapons despite the risks; finance Ukraine’s military industries; negotiate with Mr Trump to buy American air-defence systems for Ukraine; and use frozen Russian assets to pay for it all.

With Russia determined to press its invasion, and America seemingly determined to pull away, Ukraine will have to fight on, Mr Shimer says. “Now is the time for the Europeans to intensify their aid to Ukraine—so that Ukraine has the support it needs to defend itself and to push Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations."

https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/0 ... pping-away

[Hellraiser]

Analysis of demographic figures from February indicates that the Russian birth rate has fallen to its lowest level in over 200 years.

[tabascoboy]

They really don't have a clue do they



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