What's going on in Ukraine?

[Hal Jordan]

Just like every armed force has its traditions (Rum bum and sun for the Navy, dimwit second sons of the landed gentry getting a commission in the Army) Russia has a proud and noble tradition of corruption and graft that predates the soviet era.

Reports from the Crimean War seem relevant to todays conflict:
The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
Wall of text spoiler from the economist 1854

Spoiler

Show

A YEAR ago we ventured to hint that it might be worthwhile for Europe to go to war with Russia for the sake of information — in order to ascertain that is whether her strength was that of the bully or the giant — whether she was really entitled to dictate and domineer as she habitually did — whether, in a word, she was mighty in virtue of her own inherent force, or only in virtue of the ignorant timidity of her foes and rivals. We pointed out several notable sources of weakness in her institutions; we directed attention to the fact that nearly all her great acquisitions had been secured not by fighting but by bullying and intriguing; that diplomacy and not war had always been her favourite weapon; that she kept up such an enormous army on paper that all secondary States had arrived at the conclusion that resistance to her will was hopeless, but that in general she bad carefully abstained from coming into actual armed collision with any first rate Power. We expressed an opinion, too, that there was no reason whatever to suppose that her armies were as effective now as in 1815, when they were supported by the subsidies of England and trained and disciplined by wars with France; and we ventured to surmise that when they came into actual conflict with competent forces and skilful commanders they would exhibit a degree of feebleness and failure that would cause general amazement. Our suspicions have now been more than realised. […]

This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.

In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action. […]

Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.

This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.

Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.

Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.

Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.

I'm no expert on 19th century warfare, but would some of that have been true for other nations then? I feel like it might have been in the days when aristocrats raised and maintained their regiments.

Either way, when others have moved on and learned lessons over time, it sounds like the Russians are still maintaining some 'traditions' over 150+ years later.

Yep. Richard Holmes' book, Redcoat, has stories of regiments drawing pay for "ghost soldiers" who had either been killed in combat or discharged through wounds, or straight up never even existed, with the money going straight into the commanding officer's pockets (plus commission for those that did the actual work of the fiddle).

[tabascoboy]

More insight into what's happening around Kherson, it seems slow but many pre-requisites need to be achieved first it seems



If you can't read the twitter posts check https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1570 ... 34946.html instead - it has the associated images too

[fishfoodie]

Wouldn't want to be the rearguard !

It'll probably play out like the Iraqis shambolic retreat out of Kuwait, & the massacre on the highway to hell; but with artillery, not A-10s, & Apaches tearing up the worlds biggest traffic jam.

[Hellraiser]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

[fishfoodie]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

[Wyndham Upalot]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

Because of my background, I generally don't post on this topic. However, this assertion is probably very true. Watch this space.

[Niegs]

[tabascoboy]

[FalseBayFC]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

Because of my background, I generally don't post on this topic. However, this assertion is probably very true. Watch this space.

Cut off Crimea from the mainland. Twin axis offensive from Kherson and Zaporizha. Need to break Kherson first. They've been revving the ammo dumps in Tokmak and Vasyilivka already so its well in range for a softening up.

[yermum]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

Because of my background, I generally don't post on this topic. However, this assertion is probably very true. Watch this space.

Can I ask what your background is? or is it eyes only...

[Calculon]

merchant of death, innit? but if it's death to Russian soldiers...

[tabascoboy]

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

Because of my background, I generally don't post on this topic. However, this assertion is probably very true. Watch this space.

Can I ask what your background is? or is it eyes only...

He could tell you, but then he'd have to kill you...

[tabascoboy]

[petej]

Good tankie/quisling downfall.

[_Os_]

UAF have secured three bridgeheads over the Oskil.

Ukraine could be back in Melitopol before Winter hits properly, & get that defensible foothold over the Dnipro.

There's a lot of talk on Russian Telegram accounts of a third Ukrainian offensive being planned for either Melitopol or Mariupol. Melitopol has had Ukrainian partisan/special forces activity the entire war, and looks the more strategically valuable.

If Ukraine manages to do that and cuts the land corridor between Crimea and Russia, then Kherson becomes an even more untenable position for Russia. The terrain north of Crimea is very flat and marshy and not that populated. If Russia doesn't hold the population centres that do exist (Kherson/Melitopol/Mariupol) then it loses that entire area. Once it has lost that area it's essentially back to the pre-2022 borders and Russia has completely lost the 2022 war. Crimea would then be in such a weak position (all the Russian bases/ports/airfields/railways/etc would be under Ukrainian artillery fire), Russia would have to start contemplating losing the 2014 war too.

Can't see Russia retreating from Melitopol. Similar to how Russia refuse to leave Kherson, even after it's clear they're losing it. Russia doesn't have the ability to advance, but holding defencive positions is different. Russia retreated from Kharkiv when they were beaten and getting surrounded there, but the stakes are lower there (all they risked losing other than Kharkiv is northern Luhansk, which is a box surrounded on 3 sides by Russia and has limited strategic value).

If the conflict doesn't end in a Ukrainian total victory, then there's going to be a line of control with defences neither can get through, like already exists in Donetsk. The Korea outcome where there's never officially peace and Russia keeps it's 2014 gains, is probably the "best" Russia can aim for now (still terrible for Russia, they literally become North Korea and remain sanctioned up to their eyeballs). Russia's big problem in reaching that outcome is they're definitely losing Kherson, which weakens Russia's hold on Crimea.

Putin's best chance of survival is walking away from the whole thing and getting sanctions removed asap. Lots of fires start appearing the more he picks other options, all bigger than the single fire he faces accepting defeat (putting down the hardliners). Not convinced his 4D chess super brain is up to it though.

[Uncle fester]

If Putin is a 10D brain after all, he'll keep Crimea and nothing else. The rest is gone. More than likely Ukraine is going to take the whole fücking lot off him now.

[Camroc2]

And Kaliningrad will come into play.

There is no way the EU/NATO will not take advantage of Russia' s situation to ensure that it ceases to exist as a Russian advance camp in the EU.

[Flockwitt]

And Kaliningrad will come into play.

There is no way the EU/NATO will not take advantage of Russia' s situation to ensure that it ceases to exist as a Russian advance camp in the EU.

Can't see this happening. This war is about respecting existing borders. There won't be the moral leverage needed to pull that off.

[_Os_]

If Putin is a 10D brain after all, he'll keep Crimea and nothing else. The rest is gone. More than likely Ukraine is going to take the whole fücking lot off him now.

Putin maybe only expanded the operation in 2014 to include Donbas (the original plan was all of southern Ukraine) because he didn't know how to lock in Crimea, so tried to add more territory as a bargaining chip. But then Ukraine fought back in 2014 and Russia was confined to a corner of Donbas, this also took a lot of Russians out of Ukrainian politics making compromise with Russia less likely (no Ukrainian leader has accepted losing any territory). He already got Ukraine wrong in 2014, in how much Ukraine would fight (as much as possible) and how much they would give up afterwards (nothing).

Putin would be smart to withdraw from everywhere other than Crimea, then hope (probably too late as you say). But he could've done that years ago.

[Calculon]

Doesn't seem likely, from what I've read at least, that Putin can survive loosing this war. Retreating to try and hold on to Crimea only, can also surely not be spun as as anything but a defeat. So Putin's best strategy would be to keep fighting and hope something unforseen happens to turn the tide of the war.

There was, or still is, quite a bit of talk how Europe, basically Germany, would fold this winter and start to ease sanctions on Russia. Personally, I don't see this happening.

[tabascoboy]

Another unroll of a long series of tweets, with images worth reading

1/ @ian_matveev, who's one of the smartest Russian-language commentators on the Ukraine war, has posted a very interesting and detailed thread discussing the reasons for Russia's defeat east of Kharkiv. An English translation, with his permission, follows (LONG thread ahead!).

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1571 ... 91392.html

[tabascoboy]

[Uncle fester]

If Putin is a 10D brain after all, he'll keep Crimea and nothing else. The rest is gone. More than likely Ukraine is going to take the whole fücking lot off him now.

Putin maybe only expanded the operation in 2014 to include Donbas (the original plan was all of southern Ukraine) because he didn't know how to lock in Crimea, so tried to add more territory as a bargaining chip. But then Ukraine fought back in 2014 and Russia was confined to a corner of Donbas, this also took a lot of Russians out of Ukrainian politics making compromise with Russia less likely (no Ukrainian leader has accepted losing any territory). He already got Ukraine wrong in 2014, in how much Ukraine would fight (as much as possible) and how much they would give up afterwards (nothing).

Putin would be smart to withdraw from everywhere other than Crimea, then hope (probably too late as you say). But he could've done that years ago.

With Crimea within range of Ukrainian attacks, they can level the place if Russia try their usual trick of attacking civilian infrastructure.

[Hellraiser]

That'll be sent straight to Poland to be taken apart.

[laurent]

That'll be sent straight to Poland to be taken apart.

Most of the advanced components are French so not anything not seen before

[fishfoodie]

That'll be sent straight to Poland to be taken apart.

Most of the advanced components are French so not anything not seen before

I'd assume it won't be stopping long in Poland, & will just get dragged into the back of a loadmaster, & flown to Kentucky, where it's armor will get dissected, after every element of the fire control systems are analysed ?

What's important is how to kill 'em, everything else is just gravy.

[Hellraiser]

They towed it away with a captured T-72B3. Nice touch.

[Niegs]

Her follow-up comment made me LOL.

[Hugo]

Just like every armed force has its traditions (Rum bum and sun for the Navy, dimwit second sons of the landed gentry getting a commission in the Army) Russia has a proud and noble tradition of corruption and graft that predates the soviet era.

Reports from the Crimean War seem relevant to todays conflict:
The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.
Wall of text spoiler from the economist 1854

Spoiler

Show

A YEAR ago we ventured to hint that it might be worthwhile for Europe to go to war with Russia for the sake of information — in order to ascertain that is whether her strength was that of the bully or the giant — whether she was really entitled to dictate and domineer as she habitually did — whether, in a word, she was mighty in virtue of her own inherent force, or only in virtue of the ignorant timidity of her foes and rivals. We pointed out several notable sources of weakness in her institutions; we directed attention to the fact that nearly all her great acquisitions had been secured not by fighting but by bullying and intriguing; that diplomacy and not war had always been her favourite weapon; that she kept up such an enormous army on paper that all secondary States had arrived at the conclusion that resistance to her will was hopeless, but that in general she bad carefully abstained from coming into actual armed collision with any first rate Power. We expressed an opinion, too, that there was no reason whatever to suppose that her armies were as effective now as in 1815, when they were supported by the subsidies of England and trained and disciplined by wars with France; and we ventured to surmise that when they came into actual conflict with competent forces and skilful commanders they would exhibit a degree of feebleness and failure that would cause general amazement. Our suspicions have now been more than realised. […]

This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.

In the first place, the nature of the country and the want of roads. Her resources may be vast but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action. […]

Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies on paper only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number on the books and as small a number in the field as possible — inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being as inadequately fed and clothed as possible — inasmuch they pocket the difference between the sum allowed and the sum expended on the soldiers’ rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition wagon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.

This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources, both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy: the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:— Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another — and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their spécialité. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. There is only one eye over all: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done: everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.

Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love for their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by the knout*, neglected by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,— we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Shamyl** and his warriors, — but even against courageous well fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Oltenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged as a mercy to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.

Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. … Since the great Roman Empire probably, no State ever enfolded so many bitter enmities within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes.

Now these three last sources of Russian weakness are perennial. They belong to her as a despotism as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.

I'm no expert on 19th century warfare, but would some of that have been true for other nations then? I feel like it might have been in the days when aristocrats raised and maintained their regiments.

Either way, when others have moved on and learned lessons over time, it sounds like the Russians are still maintaining some 'traditions' over 150+ years later.

To your point the British forces were poorly supplied (certainly compared to the French) in the Crimea and the mismanagement of the war discredited the aristocracy in the imagination of the British public. American writer Nathaniel Hawthorne said of this that "the year of 1854 did the work of fifty ordinary ones in undermining aristocracy".

The 1860s was a decade of reforms in Russia, the most significant being the abolition of serfdom and this reformist mindset was brought about by the failure of Russia in the Crimea. The reforms did not really result in the modernisation of Russia because as ever the Tsar's overarching concern was to consolidate his power.

[tabascoboy]

Quite hard to find definite information of the true state of play in Ukraine at the moment and sifting through reports many are based purely on rumour while clearly OPSEC is becoming more crucial. UA appear to have taken and liberated more and more villages/small towns though not all of them will have been defensible or garrisoned. Lyman is mostly surrounded by UA it seems and with only one point of access for RU for supplies or what is likely to be eventual retreat without rapid and considerable reinforcement. RU forces through Wagner keep hammering away pointlessly at Bakhmut and launching long range punitive strikes against mainly civilian/infrastructure targets.

It's rumoured that the RU forces have been given a strict no-retreat order for Donbass while UA keep up the psyops against the Kherson positions to encourage surrender or retreat. The drafting of prisoners to (weakly) bolster RU forces continues, for all the use that it is; plus the talk of a new 4th Army Corps ( the 3rd was pretty much totally ineffective ). The RU forces in Kherson reportedly now struggling to resupply. RU still intent on a "referendum" in LPR and DPR this month for a quick annexation into Russia itself, which would give them the "right "all forms of self-defence".

The RU economy continues to sink, with exchanges suffering falls before an expected address from Putin soon. RU politics appears to be more and more riven between the hardliners who want no holds barred war and mobilisation, and the quieter minority (?) who think it should just continue as is, with very few seeming to publicly call for peaceful resolution.

Meanwhile of course, the liberated areas continue to reveal the full horrors of Russian occupation...

And it's been a while but another possible cigarette related incident

[tabascoboy]

[PornDog]

Free and fair referendum bingo - whats your guess for the percentage of people that will vote to join Russia?

I'm going with 92% - big enough to be overwhelming, but not quite crossing into that too big zone where you lose the plausible claim that its legit!

[laurent]

Free and fair referendum bingo - whats your guess for the percentage of people that will vote to join Russia?

I'm going with 92% - big enough to be overwhelming, but not quite crossing into that too big zone where you lose the plausible claim that its legit!

With a week to organise no sane person will think it is.

[tabascoboy]

[fishfoodie]

I don't suppose the interviewer asked when Turkey was going to hand back Northern Cyprus ?

It's funny the way territorial integrity is always a one-way street.

[Flockwitt]

Quite hard to find definite information of the true state of play in Ukraine at the moment and sifting through reports many are based purely on rumour while clearly OPSEC is becoming more crucial. UA appear to have taken and liberated more and more villages/small towns though not all of them will have been defensible or garrisoned. Lyman is mostly surrounded by UA it seems and with only one point of access for RU for supplies or what is likely to be eventual retreat without rapid and considerable reinforcement. RU forces through Wagner keep hammering away pointlessly at Bakhmut and launching long range punitive strikes against mainly civilian/infrastructure targets.

It's rumoured that the RU forces have been given a strict no-retreat order for Donbass while UA keep up the psyops against the Kherson positions to encourage surrender or retreat. The drafting of prisoners to (weakly) bolster RU forces continues, for all the use that it is; plus the talk of a new 4th Army Corps ( the 3rd was pretty much totally ineffective ). The RU forces in Kherson reportedly now struggling to resupply. RU still intent on a "referendum" in LPR and DPR this month for a quick annexation into Russia itself, which would give them the "right "all forms of self-defence".

The RU economy continues to sink, with exchanges suffering falls before an expected address from Putin soon. RU politics appears to be more and more riven between the hardliners who want no holds barred war and mobilisation, and the quieter minority (?) who think it should just continue as is, with very few seeming to publicly call for peaceful resolution.

Meanwhile of course, the liberated areas continue to reveal the full horrors of Russian occupation...

It's strange, Ukraine has had enough time to reorganise for another serious assault, but right now they're just pushing with their existing forces in the line and managing to keep the lid on their next intentions.

[Slick]

I don't suppose the interviewer asked when Turkey was going to hand back Northern Cyprus ?

It's funny the way territorial integrity is always a one-way street.

Didn't they take a decent chunk of Syria fairly recently as well?

[fishfoodie]

I don't suppose the interviewer asked when Turkey was going to hand back Northern Cyprus ?

It's funny the way territorial integrity is always a one-way street.

Didn't they take a decent chunk of Syria fairly recently as well?

Anything to fuck over the Kurds

[PornDog]

Free and fair referendum bingo - whats your guess for the percentage of people that will vote to join Russia?

I'm going with 92% - big enough to be overwhelming, but not quite crossing into that too big zone where you lose the plausible claim that its legit!

With a week to organise no sane person will think it is.

Of course not, but they still wont be so brazen as to make it 98% or 99%

[tabascoboy]

Strange goings on in Russia, Putin's vaunted speech broadcast hasn't happened and the earlier announcements giving time and then "delay" have been removed. Latest is that it will happen at 8am Weds Moscow time ( pre-recorded of course). Internal disagreements maybe?

And...