What's going on in Ukraine?

[Hellraiser]

So little of the new kit sent to ukraine seems to be in use. The vast majority seems to held back for the coming offensive.

Where do you think the Ukrainians will attack? Mariupol, melitopol?

The South makes the most sense, but whether it's Mariupol, Melitopol, or Berdyansk, I have no idea. The path to Mariupol seems to be the least fortified surprisingly; Volnovakha in particular seems fairly piecemeal. Punching down from Vuhledar and retaking Volnovakha would open the roads to Mariupol and Berdyansk, and hundreds of sq kms of essentially unfortified territory between Bilmak and Berdyansk in the west and the Russian border in the east. Any Russian forces between Volnovakha and Fedorivka would be forced to withdraw west and south to avoid being cut-off and/or encircled as the Ukrainians swing west to roll up the Russian line. Even without entering Mariupol or Berdyansk, the Crimean land bridge would be severed, and resupply of all remaining Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea would become extremely difficult.

It's a hard call, the push south is so obvious that RU has had plenty of time to prepare ( in their own unique way ), wonder if we'll see a few feints as a distraction - although that didn't work too well for RU.

The longer odds option is the north and a push through Svatove to Starobilsk; flanking Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk, and opening the road to Luhansk city. The go big or go home option is to mount an eastern assault simultaneously through Marinka and Bakhmut to flank and encircle Donetsk city and Horlivka. And the batshit crazy option is an amphibious assault across the Dnipro into southern Kherson.

[Hellraiser]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volos_Declaration

[tabascoboy]

The South makes the most sense, but whether it's Mariupol, Melitopol, or Berdyansk, I have no idea. The path to Mariupol seems to be the least fortified surprisingly; Volnovakha in particular seems fairly piecemeal. Punching down from Vuhledar and retaking Volnovakha would open the roads to Mariupol and Berdyansk, and hundreds of sq kms of essentially unfortified territory between Bilmak and Berdyansk in the west and the Russian border in the east. Any Russian forces between Volnovakha and Fedorivka would be forced to withdraw west and south to avoid being cut-off and/or encircled as the Ukrainians swing west to roll up the Russian line. Even without entering Mariupol or Berdyansk, the Crimean land bridge would be severed, and resupply of all remaining Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea would become extremely difficult.

It's a hard call, the push south is so obvious that RU has had plenty of time to prepare ( in their own unique way ), wonder if we'll see a few feints as a distraction - although that didn't work too well for RU.

The longer odds option is the north and a push through Svatove to Starobilsk; flanking Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk, and opening the road to Luhansk city. The go big or go home option is to mount an eastern assault simultaneously through Marinka and Bakhmut to flank and encircle Donetsk city and Horlivka. And the batshit crazy option is an amphibious assault across the Dnipro into southern Kherson.

I hope that we can rule that one out - unless UA have some awesome game-changer no-one knows about!

Those more in the know that me still concerned about lack of numbers in air support for the UA counter-offensive.

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

It's a hard call, the push south is so obvious that RU has had plenty of time to prepare ( in their own unique way ), wonder if we'll see a few feints as a distraction - although that didn't work too well for RU.

The longer odds option is the north and a push through Svatove to Starobilsk; flanking Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk, and opening the road to Luhansk city. The go big or go home option is to mount an eastern assault simultaneously through Marinka and Bakhmut to flank and encircle Donetsk city and Horlivka. And the batshit crazy option is an amphibious assault across the Dnipro into southern Kherson.

I hope that we can rule that one out - unless UA have some awesome game-changer no-one knows about!

Those more in the know that me still concerned about lack of numbers in air support for the UA counter-offensive.

Air support, or lack of, is priced in. I've never quite understood why a lot of people think the Russian air force will be more active this Summer than they were during the Kherson and Kharkiv counter-offensives.

[_Os_]

Your predictions gentlemen.

Month commencing: Starting end of May into early June. End of the main offensive in late July into early August. The offensive generally lasting into 2024 around February.

Directions: Surprise attack in northern Luhansk to try and replay Kharkiv, this is not the main thrust and intended to get the Russians thinking and moving forces. Russia is weaker there (than in the south and in Donetsk) and fighting hasn't been as heavy there, main target is Svatove and all its rail/road connections etc. If Russia don't respond Ukraine puts more forces in and take more ground, they keep doing so until Russia commits.
Main thrust then hits in the south (but there is an option to keep going in Luhansk if Russia doesn't respond there) where all the reported Ukrainian build up is. There's no surprise element here, so Ukraine soften multiple points along the line (or even the entire line), leaving Russia guessing where it's coming (while also guessing about the attack in Luhansk). Primary objective is to cut off Melitopol, secondary objective is to bring the entire south under Ukrainian fire control if that cannot be achieved immediately. Both will give Ukraine a territorial toehold in Crimea by early next year, the former is just quicker with less death.

Strategic objective: Retaking Crimea. Ukraine's economy depends on exports that go through the Black Sea, these exports depend on being able to freely use all Ukrainian ports and the Black Sea (and being able to freely transport goods down the Dnipro river). If Russia holds Crimea then it controls Ukraine, because military forces positioned on Crimea can control Ukrainian access to international markets. Russia will never give up Crimea through a negotiation. This all means Ukraine's top strategic objective must be creating facts on the ground that show to Russia through military force that Crimea is more part of Ukrainian territory than it is Russian.

[Grandpa]

Your predictions gentlemen.

Month commencing: Starting end of May into early June. End of the main offensive in late July into early August. The offensive generally lasting into 2024 around February.

Directions: Surprise attack in northern Luhansk to try and replay Kharkiv, this is not the main thrust and intended to get the Russians thinking and moving forces. Russia is weaker there (than in the south and in Donetsk) and fighting hasn't been as heavy there, main target is Svatove and all its rail/road connections etc. If Russia don't respond Ukraine puts more forces in and take more ground, they keep doing so until Russia commits.
Main thrust then hits in the south (but there is an option to keep going in Luhansk if Russia doesn't respond there) where all the reported Ukrainian build up is. There's no surprise element here, so Ukraine soften multiple points along the line (or even the entire line), leaving Russia guessing where it's coming (while also guessing about the attack in Luhansk). Primary objective is to cut off Melitopol, secondary objective is to bring the entire south under Ukrainian fire control if that cannot be achieved immediately. Both will give Ukraine a territorial toehold in Crimea by early next year, the former is just quicker with less death.

Strategic objective: Retaking Crimea. Ukraine's economy depends on exports that go through the Black Sea, these exports depend on being able to freely use all Ukrainian ports and the Black Sea (and being able to freely transport goods down the Dnipro river). If Russia holds Crimea then it controls Ukraine, because military forces positioned on Crimea can control Ukrainian access to international markets. Russia will never give up Crimea through a negotiation. This all means Ukraine's top strategic objective must be creating facts on the ground that show to Russia through military force that Crimea is more part of Ukrainian territory than it is Russian.

Do you see a positive end possible before the next US General Election?

[_Os_]

Do you see a positive end possible before the next US General Election?

So lets say Trump gets in again, and for fucked "culture war" reasons he decides to basically help Russia in an actual real era defining war. If Ukraine is forced to negotiate by Trump, how good the outcome is depends on how much of Crimea Ukraine either has or can threaten.

Any version of a positive end needs Ukraine to have some Crimean territory or a situation where it has it under fire control and it's not safe for Russia. Both need Ukraine to control the coast north of it, so that's the absolute minimum for a good outcome. That is maybe possible by November, but I have no clue, my guess is it takes Ukraine a bit longer to get that. Russia's defencive strategy seems to be building static defencive lines not far from the current line of contact, once Ukraine has punched a hole it's all bypassed and a lot could fall quickly, but it's all unknown.

The area north of Crimea is open swampy land, low population density. With all the standoff man portable weapons Ukraine has, once Russia lose it they will not get it back without huge losses. It only fell at the start of the full scale invasion because Ukraine failed to defend there (Ukrainian columns destroyed, one of the Ukrainian generals in that area could've been a Russian asset, a bit of a disaster).

[Flockwitt]

Good post there OS. Time to put the fecund organ up for extreme circumcision.

I like the idea of the northern swing but my guess is as follows.

There'll be an attack on the southern Zap front in the schedule you've mentioned late May at this stage - weather and logistics are crimping an early May start, though I wouldn't entirely discount some sort of counter-attack May 8. The Ukrainians will go south because that's where they can best leverage the firepower advantage of the NATO weapons, Having a tank that can kill the opposition at kms of distance isn't much use in woods.

Just where the Ukrainian's attack may be troop dependent though. They ideally will want to hit highly reconstituted forces with a lot of mobiks in them, much like they went through the occupied territory conscripts previously.

I think they'll get through the Zap front line defences okay. Where Ukraine is going to have a serious issue is with the Melitopol defensive line. The long estuary runs up into the city which then only has a short distance north to the nuclear power plant and the Dnipro. The Russians have always been able to retreat in good order and if they fall back to that line they will be very hard to dislodge. Ukraine can't level the city Russian style and the front line to defend is short enough Russia should be able to hold it. If they do from there on in for Kherson and Crimea I think it will be a squeezing operation, much like they did in north Kherson, attacking the Crimea bridge and the narrow isthmus roads from Crimea - which could take months to be effective. Could Ukraine attempt a Dnipro crossing later this year? Perhaps, but there'll be a lot of water under the bridge between now and then.

Ukraine can drive down to Mairupol and take that because they can cut the city off completely left and right and I think they will do it. Except, depending on circumstance they may well attempt a hook up behind Donetsk city to collapse the southern Donbas line, a reverse of what the Russians wanted to do at Vuhledar. If they can attempt a pincer movement attacking both north and south railway lines into Donetsk so much the better. This would effectively win the war if Russia has to abandon a big chunk of the previously occupied territories. This is where the current battle in Bahkmut is working to Ukraine's advantage. With the two most effective units in the Russian army, the Wagner group and the airborne troops getting chewed up there it may well mean Russian doesn't have effective manpower to hold an impromptu extended front along a Vuhledar to Sea of Azov front. The airborne troops were the major headache in Kherson, always able to stop the Ukrainians advances in open terrain - this current grind in Bahkmut is laying the platform for a successful offense as noted.

The north Luhansk region offensive will be a good public relations take seeing a swath of land reclaimed, but it leaves a very long exposed rear Russian border for the Ukrainians attempting to sweep southwards and this will need careful consideration regards the various potential objectives.

Crimea is a prime strategic goal I agree, it will fall eventually if Ukraine reaches and holds Mariupol and once Crimea falls at that point Russia will have lost.

[_Os_]

Where Ukraine is going to have a serious issue is with the Melitopol defensive line. The long estuary runs up into the city which then only has a short distance north to the nuclear power plant and the Dnipro. The Russians have always been able to retreat in good order and if they fall back to that line they will be very hard to dislodge. Ukraine can't level the city Russian style and the front line to defend is short enough Russia should be able to hold it.

Cutting it off and putting it under siege (not a heavy one, food allowed in, civilians allowed out, no Russian style bombardment), looks like the best option? It's useless to Russia if Ukraine can do that, and given the flat open terrain around the city that's possible.

Interesting, your pick is very different to mine!

[Grandpa]

Do you see a positive end possible before the next US General Election?

So lets say Trump gets in again, and for fucked "culture war" reasons he decides to basically help Russia in an actual real era defining war. If Ukraine is forced to negotiate by Trump, how good the outcome is depends on how much of Crimea Ukraine either has or can threaten.

Any version of a positive end needs Ukraine to have some Crimean territory or a situation where it has it under fire control and it's not safe for Russia. Both need Ukraine to control the coast north of it, so that's the absolute minimum for a good outcome. That is maybe possible by November, but I have no clue, my guess is it takes Ukraine a bit longer to get that. Russia's defencive strategy seems to be building static defencive lines not far from the current line of contact, once Ukraine has punched a hole it's all bypassed and a lot could fall quickly, but it's all unknown.

The area north of Crimea is open swampy land, low population density. With all the standoff man portable weapons Ukraine has, once Russia lose it they will not get it back without huge losses. It only fell at the start of the full scale invasion because Ukraine failed to defend there (Ukrainian columns destroyed, one of the Ukrainian generals in that area could've been a Russian asset, a bit of a disaster).

Thanks. Just trying not to imagine the situation where Ukraine is on the cusp of victory and the next US Govt leaves the Ukraine vulnerable because of politics.

[Flockwitt]

Where Ukraine is going to have a serious issue is with the Melitopol defensive line. The long estuary runs up into the city which then only has a short distance north to the nuclear power plant and the Dnipro. The Russians have always been able to retreat in good order and if they fall back to that line they will be very hard to dislodge. Ukraine can't level the city Russian style and the front line to defend is short enough Russia should be able to hold it.

Cutting it off and putting it under siege (not a heavy one, food allowed in, civilians allowed out, no Russian style bombardment), looks like the best option? It's useless to Russia if Ukraine can do that, and given the flat open terrain around the city that's possible.

Interesting, your pick is very different to mine!

At least we can say Ukraine has some options.

A siege of Melitopol may be doable, but should Ukraine do it? It'll be a major investment of resources and slow unless Ukraine has been able to break through the front line leaving the Russians in complete disarray, which they've yet to achieve. Admittedly there may be a middle ground where Ukraine does successfully drive down the south side of the Dnipro but there's a lot of now fortified towns like Mykhailivka which are going to have to be taken in the process.

[tabascoboy]

We an just hope that by now demoralisation in the ranks of the RU regulars. mobiks and local militia units plays its part, I'd like to think that PMCs would also be far less motivated to hold a line under pressure in retreat in a counter-offensive and all of them in general more interested in getting back home alive to make use of their plundered goods.

UA will be able to get some decent intelligence covertly and overtly , and the use of drones has already been shown to be vital in a quickly changing arena.

[Hellraiser]

[tabascoboy]

One day, and we can only hope soon, there will be a reckoning for this tyrannical society

Vladimir Kara-Murza: Russian opposition figure jailed for 25 years

Opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza has been sentenced to 25 years in jail in Russia for charges linked to his criticism of the war in Ukraine.

He was found guilty of treason, spreading "false" information about the Russian army and being affiliated with an "undesirable organisation".

The Russian-British former journalist and politician is the latest of several Putin opponents to have been arrested or forced to flee Russia.

He has denied all of the charges.

Last week, he said in a statement: "I subscribe to every word that I have said... Not only do I not repent any of this, I am proud of it."

"I know that the day will come when the darkness engulfing our country will clear," he added in remarks posted online. "Our society will open its eyes and shudder when it realises what crimes were committed in its name."

Mr Kara-Murza's 25-year sentence was the maximum sought by prosecutors and is the longest sentence an opposition figure has received since the war in Ukraine began.

[tabascoboy]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

Head of the GUR Budanov said that the intelligence officers already know the name of the Russian soldier who cut off the head of the Ukrainian prisoner.

"It just so happened that almost all of those who did similar things, where it was clearly known to us, no longer exist. Therefore, I do not think that this person will be an exception," he said in an interview with Radio NV

hromadske | news here

[laurent]

looks like Prigozhin will be next in the Hague list (if he survives)

[tabascoboy]

[tabascoboy]

Putin supposedly visiting Kherson and Donbass regions today, again very dubious

[TB63]

[laurent]

Time for some road rage

[tabascoboy]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

[Hellraiser]

This is a really useful link for any overview of Ukrainian force structure and units:

https://militaryland.net/ukraine/

[Hellraiser]

So the same storage facility at Lenta that has been repairing and servicing Italian 155mm M109Ls to send to Ukraine also very quietly started refurbishing Leopard 1A5s in Feb/March, the last of which were taken out of service in 2008. Italian law prevents disclosing the details of military sales/aid to other countries, but it's known that a deal to sell 100 of them to an undisclosed South American country fell through last October. It's doubtful they would be being returned to running order without another "buyer" in mind....

[Hellraiser]

[fishfoodie]

The proles can enjoy the sight of the young Octobrists marching in their ill fitting uniforms, following a T-34 .... won't be long before they're called up & sent to the front anyway.

[Hellraiser]

Those videos of the 118th Mechanized Brigade back in Ukraine have caused a certain degree of panic among Russian milbloggers; noting several thousand troops wearing standard uniforms, body armour, helmets, and assault rifles.

Ukraine now has, from what OSINT can ascertain:

• 118 Combat brigades (Army, Territorial, Offensive Guard, etc.)
• 31 Support brigades (Artillery, Army Aviation, Engineers, Air Defense, etc.

And apparently there is in actuality 175 brigades in total, across all branches of the military. Given Ukrainians brigades are roughly 4,000 strong that means the Ukrainians have approx. 700k troops under arms. And that probably doesn't include the 2-3k irregular troops in non-regularised volunteer units.

According to figures I got from the Atlantic council, Ukraine began the war with 38 manoeuvre (infantry and tank) brigades and 9 artillery brigades.

The long and short of it is that Ukraine now has a bigger army than Russia.

[TB63]

FuDbT-taIAEp18V.jpeg (72.66 KiB) Viewed 841 times

[dkm57]

Quite clearly a double, as well as the undershot jaw, the shape of the skull around the eye is different and there is something different about the shape of the ear and its position relevant to the rest of the head.

[TB63]

[Hellraiser]

[tabascoboy]

Ukraine war: The Russian ships accused of North Sea sabotage

Russia has a programme to sabotage wind farms and communication cables in the North Sea, according to new allegations. The details come from a joint investigation by public broadcasters in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. It says Russia has a fleet of vessels disguised as fishing trawlers and research vessels in the North Sea.

They carry underwater surveillance equipment and are mapping key sites for possible sabotage.

The BBC understands that UK officials are aware of Russian vessels moving around UK waters as part of the programme.

The first of a series of reports is due to be broadcast on Wednesday by DR in Denmark, NRK in Norway, SVT in Sweden and Yle in Finland.

A Danish counter-intelligence officer says the sabotage plans are being prepared in case of a full conflict with the West while the head of Norwegian intelligence told the broadcasters the programme was considered highly important for Russia and controlled directly from Moscow.

The broadcasters say they have analysed intercepted Russian communications which indicate so-called ghost ships sailing in Nordic waters which have turned off the transmitters so as not to reveal their locations.

The report focuses on a Russian vessel called the Admiral Vladimirsky. Officially, this is an Expeditionary Oceanographic Ship, or underwater research vessel. But the report alleges that it is in fact a Russian spy ship.

The documentary uses an anonymous former UK Royal Navy expert to track the movements of the vessel in the vicinity of seven wind farms off the coast of the UK and the Netherlands on one mission.

t says the vessel slows down when it approaches areas where there are wind farms and loiters in the area. It says it sailed for a month with its transmitter turned off.

When a reporter approached the ship on a small boat, he was confronted by a masked individual carrying what appeared to be a military assault rifle.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65309687

[Brazil]

Those videos of the 118th Mechanized Brigade back in Ukraine have caused a certain degree of panic among Russian milbloggers; noting several thousand troops wearing standard uniforms, body armour, helmets, and assault rifles.

Ukraine now has, from what OSINT can ascertain:

• 118 Combat brigades (Army, Territorial, Offensive Guard, etc.)
• 31 Support brigades (Artillery, Army Aviation, Engineers, Air Defense, etc.

And apparently there is in actuality 175 brigades in total, across all branches of the military. Given Ukrainians brigades are roughly 4,000 strong that means the Ukrainians have approx. 700k troops under arms. And that probably doesn't include the 2-3k irregular troops in non-regularised volunteer units.

According to figures I got from the Atlantic council, Ukraine began the war with 38 manoeuvre (infantry and tank) brigades and 9 artillery brigades.

The long and short of it is that Ukraine now has a bigger army than Russia.

Last winter was described to me as the equivalent of the Atlantic Gap in 1943. The Allies knew exactly what they would need for D Day, it was a question of securing the supply lines to get the logistics in place. ON the face of it, it looks like the Ukrainians have achieved success in this regard better than the Russians, though the litmus test will be late spring and summer.

I was thinking about OS and Flockwitts posts earlier on, and in particular Crimea. A Southern thrust through to Mariupol or the Azov Coastline would be a disaster for Russia and make Crimea pretty much untenable given the armaments Ukraine now possesses. the isthmus could be hit from three sides and Russian shipping in the sea of Azov wouldn't be safe either. Does anybody have a link to the map of Russian fortifications?